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Union Discrimination Checked: Ethridge
v. Rhodes Rouses A Slumbering Giant
MARIA L. MARcus*
INCE the United States Supreme Court's decision in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority,' commentators, attorneys and
judges have been speculating as to the point along the continuum
where governmental contacts with private discrimination become
substantial enough to constitute prohibited "state action" under
the fourteenth amendment. In Burton, a state agency which
leased space in a public building to a restaurant which refused
service to Negroes, was held responsible for the lessee's biased
practices. Subsequent suits brought by Negro craftsmen in the
construction industry who were refused membership on racial
grounds by plumbing, electrical and other construction unions,
sought to establish governmental responsibility for the impact
of such union policies on public building projects. The rationale
of these suits was that the state was sanctioning racial discrimin-
ation by expending millions in public funds yearly for construc-
tion, of public works built by all-white labor in the skilled crafts.
Construction unions which exercised virtually total control over
hiring refused to admit Negroes or to refer them for employment.
The New York Court of Appeals in Gaynor v. Rockefeller,2
rejected a request for an injunction against expenditure of funds
on certain New York City construction projects, finding that ju-
dicial intervention in the administration of these projects would
not be "fitting":
It is the settled policy of the courts not to review the ex-
ercise of discretion by public officials in the enforcement
of state statutes, in the absence of a clear violation of
some constitutional mandate . . . No basis is here shown for
charging the State or City with being a party to the denial
to the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws in vio-
lation of Federal or State constitutional guarantees. Neither
the State nor the City has here either affirmatively sanc-
tioned any discriminatory practices by statute or announced
policy, or indeed, even knowingly acquiesced therein . . -
Nor can the case be analogized, as urged by plaintiffs, to
a situation where discrimination on the part of a lessee
* Assistant Attorney General of New York State; Member, New York Bar.
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2 15 N.Y. 2d 120, 204 N.E. 2d 627, 256 N.Y.S. 2d 584 (1965).
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of a portion of a state-owned and operated public enter-
prise becomes chargeable to the State itself by reason of
particular circumstances which stamp the latter as a "joint
participant" with the lessee and demonstrate its essential
"interdependence" with such lessee. (See Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725, supra),.
A few months ago, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio decided in Ethridge v. Rhodes4 that
irreparable injury would result to the Negro plaintiffs, an elec-
trician and an operating engineer, if state officials were permitted
to sign construction contracts with firms whose hiring was dele-
gated to racially exclusionary unions:
. . [W]hen a state has become a joint participant in a pat-
tern of racially discriminatory conduct by placing itself in
a position of interdependence with private individuals act-
ing in such a manner - that is, the proposed contractors
acting under contract with unions that bar Negroes - this
constitutes a type of "state action" proscribed by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, supra. Thus, as in the instant suit, where a state,
through its elected and appointed officials, undertakes to
perform essential governmental functions - herein, the con-
struction of facilities for public education - with the aid
of private persons, it cannot avoid the responsibilities im-
posed on it by the Fourteenth Amendment by merely ignor-
ing them or failing to perform them.5
These diametrically opposed results stemmed in part from
factual differences in the posture of the two cases. In Gaynor,
contracts for erection of the public buildings in question had
already been signed, posing a multiplicity of procedural questions
in regard to the rights of the contractors who were signatories
but not joined as defendants in the suit. No relief was requested
against the contractors, as the thrust of the suit was against
the public officials who had failed to invoke cancellation powers
granted to them by New York law to remedy violations of the
mandatory non-discrimination clause in public construction con-
tracts.6
3 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y. 2d 120, 131-32, 204 N.E. 2d 627, 632-33
(1965).
4 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
5 Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83, 87 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
; This clause, set out in Section 220-e(a) of the Labor Law of New York,
requires that the contractor agree "That in the hiring of employees for the
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The relief requested in Ethridge was an injunction restrain-
ing state officials from entering into a future contract involving
the building of a science facility on the campus of Ohio State
University.' The only proper parties were the Director of Public
Works, the Treasurer and the Governor, and the sole issue was
the applicability of the fourteenth amendment to the proposed
governmental sponsorship of the project.
An additional factor regarded as crucial by both courts
was that of notice to the public officers of the existence of racial
discrimination by particular unions, and notice that this dis-
crimination would bar Negroes from employment on a particular
construction site. In the Ohio case, United States District Court
Judge Kinneary noted that some contractors under consideration
for the Medical Basic Sciences Building at Ohio State University
had submitted "qualified" bids lacking the assurances of non-dis-
crimination in hiring which were required by Executive Order
of the Governor, issued on June 15, 1966. This order specified
that every hiring source for public building must not only refer
apprentices and journeymen for employment without discrimina-
tion but must, after a certain period, have Negroes in its appren-
ticeship program or forfeit the right to be a recruitment source
as to every twentieth employee hired in connection with the pub-
lic construction bid.8 Rather than rejecting the qualified bids,
the Director of the Ohio Department of Public Works requested
and obtained the Governor's agreement that the requisite non-dis-
crimination assurances be waived.
The Director of Public Works, Governor and Treasurer of Ohio
were found to have full knowledge of the effects of this waiver:
performance of work under this contract or any sub-contract hereunder, no
contractor, subcontractor nor any person acting on behalf of such contractor
or subcontractor, shall by, reason of race, creed, color or national origin dis-
criminate against any citizen of the State of New York who is qualified
and available to perform the work to which the employment relates . .. .
In Gaynor the granting of an injunction would have halted construction
of two pavillions at the New York World's Fair, a hospital, and a school;
if the court had found that plaintiffs had a cause of action under the fourteenth
amendment, it would have reached the question of whether to "balance the
equities" as to the granting of an injunction or to apply the doctrine that
relief may not be denied where constitutional rights are in issue.
8 The Order further provided that commencing January 1, 1968, the hiring
source must have Negroes both in its apprenticeship program and as journey-
men members and refer them for employment without discrimination, or waive




Defendants are aware that a number of unions have not
referred Negroes for employment on the construction of
other buildings erected by the State of Ohio on the campus
of the Ohio State University. Defendants know to a cer-
tainty that many of the unions which will be used as labor
sources by the proposed contractors on the Medical Basic
Sciences Building do not now have any Negro members. And
the defendants also know that union officials responsible for
admission to these unions have been persistently "out" or
unavailable to Negroes who seek membership in such unions.
Thus, the evidence presented establishes defendants' knowl-
edge of a pattern of discrimination against Negroes, solely
on the basis of their race, as to admission and referral by
certain of the craft unions which will be used as labor
sources for this project. There is, in addition, uncontro-
verted proof that no steps have been taken by the responsible
union officials to correct such inequities.9
While avoiding any implication that defendants intended to
deprive plaintiffs of their federal rights,10 the court held that
the officials had acquiesced in the racial exclusion of Negro work-
ers from the Ohio State construction site:
The officials of the state of Ohio, through the testimony
of the defendant, Director of Public Works, have displayed
a shocking lack of concern over the realities of this whole
situation and the inevitable discrimination that will result
from entering into and performing under the proposed con-
tracts with the proposed contractors. This Director testi-
fied that non-discrimination is just another provision of the
contract, and his best solution for correcting discrimination,
if and when it occurs, is to invoke the sanctions of the per-
formance bond. This solution is totally inadequate for the
elimination of the pattern of discrimination that has been
allowed to exist. Defendants' failure to assure qualified
minority workers equal access to job opportunities on pub-
lic construction projects by acquiescing in the discrimin-
atory practices of contractors and craft unions clearly
falls within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . .. 11
By contrast, the New York Court of Appeals found no evi-
9 Ethridge v. Rhodes, supra note 5 at 87.
10 Proof of such intent was held to be irrelevant in civil cases, under the
doctrine of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
11 Ethridge v. Rhodes, supra note 5, at 88.
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dence of possible inference that state and city officers had been
directly involved or had knowingly acquiesced in any discrimin-
ation in employment on the part of unions or contractors:
There is, indeed, not the slightest suggestion that any com-
plaint or demand for corrective action was ever made to any
of such officials, much less rejected by them.12
Nor was evidence presented as to the contractor's knowledge of
union bias - their bids were unqualified assurances of their
intention and ability to carry out all the terms of the contract.
Also cited in Gaynor as a missing link in the attempt to
attribute union conduct to the public officials, was the failure
to show that plaintiffs were refused employment on any public
construction project or that they would have been so employed
if they had been union members.'8  However, the primary factor
which led to the dismissal of the complaint without trial, was
the court's determination that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy
at law:
Moreover, the extraordinary remedies here sought by the
plaintiffs - of injunctive and declaratory relief - are
available "only where resort to ordinary actions or proceed-
ings would not afford adequate relief." . . . It may well be,
as the plaintiffs evidently believe, that judicial proceedings
of the ordinary type will not suffice to break the pattern of
discrimination which, it is alleged, permeates the construc-
tion industry. A full and adequate remedy is, however,
available to the plaintiffs by resort to the State Commission
of Human Rights and there is, accordingly, no warrant for
invocation of the aid of equity or for the granting of declar-
atory relief.14
Cited as an example of the State Commission's effectiveness
as an administrative forum was the decision in Matter of State
Commission v. Farrell.'5 This proceeding was initiated by the
Attorney General of New York State against Local 28 of the
International Association of Sheet Metal Workers, charging sys-
tematic exclusion of Negroes from apprentice training and mem-
12 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y. 2d 120, 130, 204 N.E. 2d 627, 632 (1965).
13 Plaintiffs in Ethridge had proven that they had attempted to obtain
employment on various construction sites but were told that all hiring was
done through the craft unions.
14 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y. 2d at 132, 204 N.E. 2d- at 633 (1965).
15 43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S. 2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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hership."' Evidence presented by the Attorney General showed
that it was virtually impossible to obtain employment as a jour-
neyman sheet metal worker in New York City except through
completion of Local 28's apprenticeship program, and that the
Local had never had a Negro member in its seventy-year history.
Neither chronological processing of applications nor preferences
to relatives accounted for the pattern of admissions to the pro-
gram. The State Commission found that the union was racially
discriminatory, and this finding was confirmed by the New York
Supreme Court in an order to which all parties consented. 17 The
Supreme Court's creative decision appears to have been the first
in the country to reorganize the apprenticeship recruiting meth-
ods of a union by requiring city-wide objective examinations to
be given to all qualified applicants as a basis for admission.' 8
As to the specific relief requested in Gaynor, however, the
State Commission has acknowledged that it has no power to
seek an injunction restraining continuation of public building,
even where racial discrimination is occurring."
The District Court in Ethridge reviewed the testimony con-
16 Section 296 of the Executive Law of New York forbids unions to bar
qualified persons from apprenticeship or membership on racial grounds.
17 Supra note 13.
18 Subsequent attempts by Local 28 to suspend the commencement of the
next apprenticeship class, to reduce the number of apprentices to be accepted.
and to destroy unusually high test scores achieved by a group of Negroes,
were all rejected by the New York Courts. Matter of State Comm. v. Farrell,
47 Misc. 2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1965), 47 Misc. 2d 799 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified
24 A.D. 2d 128(1965), motion for leave to appeal denied, 17 N.Y. 2d 418 (1966).
19 In a letter dated May 9, 1967, to Robert L. Carter, General Counsel of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, one of the
Hearing Commissioners in Miller v. Local 501, I.B.E.W., [C-14079-67] outlined
the Commission's limitations: "This will acknowledge receipt of the petition
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People requesting
the State Commission for Human Rights to apply to the New York Supreme
Court for a preliminary injunction restraining continuance of construction at
the urban renewal site in New Rochelle, New York. .. ."
"The State Commission for Human Rights has no authority in its own
name to seek injunctive relief in an employment case. The only authority
given to the Commission to seek injunctive relief is given by the Law Against
Discrimination, Section 297.4, which is restricted to housing cases. .. "
"Relief by injunction is an extraordinary remedy. Its grant or denial
is based upon a number of equitable principles, including the 'balancing of
equities and practicalities.' "
"In the instant case, such an injunction would affect innocent people, who
are not parties to the proceeding and are not charged with discriminating, in-
cluding the City of New Rochelle, Macy's non-respondent unions, workmen,
prospective tenants, and the public in general."
Winter, 1968]
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cerning the power of the Ohio Civil Rights Commission to pro-
vide an adequate remedy at law and ruled that the threatened
injury to Negro craftsmen in the construction industry was not
fully reparable through state statutes.
Apart from the question of the reparability of discrimina-
tion by money damages, the Director of the Ohio State
Civil Rights Commission testified that the Commission has
been ineffectual in remedying discrimination in the craft
unions. The Director further testified that even with the
powers available to the Commission, the case by case ap-
proach which must be followed by that body results in too
long a delay before any meaningful steps will be made to-
ward eliminating discrimination. 20
Delay in administration was also held to render recourse to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission created under the
Civil Rights Act of 196421 an ineffectual remedy.
Rather than "balancing the equities," Judge Kinneary found
that the irreparable harm which is the consequence of racial dis-
crimination made the issuance of an injunction imperative:
It is evident from the testimony of the several sociolo-
gists who appeared as witnesses in this case that discrimina-
tion in the area of employment stunts the educational and
technical potential development of the class subject to such
inequities. This Court is also mindful of the evidence sub-
mitted by experts in cases dealing with discrimination in
other areas of life. Such evidence pointed out that segrega-
tion and discrimination not only denote inferiority of the
class discriminated against, but also retard the development
of that class, and that in cases in which this type of activity
receives the sanction of the government, the impact is even
greater. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S.
294 (1955), 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Injuries of this kind are
not subject to any sort of monetary valuation.22
Consistent with its rejection of the case-by-case approach, the
court determined that the plaintiffs "and all other persons simi-
larly situated" were entitled to an injunction restraining de-
fendants from entering into contracts for the construction of
the Medical Basic Sciences Building with any persons utilizing,
20 Ethridge v. Rhodes, supra note 5, at 89.
21 78 Stat. 253-65, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-14 (1964).
22 Ethridge v. Rhodes, supra note 5, at 88-89.
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exclusively or primarily, a discriminatory labor source. Ap-
proval of the class action was an integral part of the "plain;
complete, practical and efficient means of effecting justice" sought
by Judge Kinneary. It obviated the necessity for separate suits
by Negroes excluded from the same unions, by focusing upon the
policy of racial exclusion rather than upon the separate circuni-
stances surrounding each rejection.
The rationale underlying such class suits was closely an-
alyzed in Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.2 3
For purposes of allowing a class action for injunctive re-
lief ... this court is unable to perceive any real distinction
between . . . a class discrimination because of race and an
individual discrimination because of race. Racial discrimin-
ation is by definition a class discrimination. If it exists, it
applies throughout the class. This does not mean, however,
that the effects of the discrimination will always be felt
equally by all the members of the racial class. For example,
if an employer's racially discriminatory preferences are
merely one of several factors which enter into employment
decisions, the unlawful preferences may or may not be con-
trolling in regard to the hiring or promotion of a particular
member of the racial class. But although the actual effects
of a discriminatory policy may thus vary throughout the
class, the existence of the discriminatory policy threatens
the entire class.
24
Most federal courts have permitted class relief to desegregate
schools, recreational facilities, voter registration offices and pub-
lic transportation facilities. The New York Court of Appeals
23 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (M.D. Tenn. 1966). A Negro employee moved
to intervene as a plaintiff in a suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, supra note 21.
24 Id. at 186.
25 See Potts v. Flax, 313 F. 2d 284 (5th Cir. 1963); Sharp v. Lucky, 252
F. 2d 910 (5th Cir. 1958); Johnson v. Yielding, 165 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. Ala.
1958); Vann v. Toledo Metropolitan Housing Authority, 113 F. Supp. 210 (N.D.
Ohio 1953); Coke v. City of Atlanta, 184 F. Supp'. 579 (N.D. Ga, 1960); Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Orleans Parish School v. Board
of Trustees of University of Kentucky, 83 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Ky. 1949);
Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La. 1950), aff'd 340
U.S. 909 (1951); Constantine v. Southwestern Louisiana Institute, 120 F. Supp.
417 (W.D. La. 1954); Tureaud v. Supervisors of Louisiana State University,
116 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. La. 1953), aff'd 228 F. 2d 895 (5th Cir. 1956); Frazier
v. Trustees of University of North Carolina, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D. N.C.
1955); Hawkins v. Board of Control, 162 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Fla, 1958); Evers
v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
Winter, 1968]
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in Gaynor found as a matter of state law that no class action can
be maintained where the wrongs alleged differ as to each plain-
tiff and where each person aggrieved might have recourse to
different remedies.26
Thus, fhe divergent holdings in Ethridge and Gaynor are
related to differences in the stage at which litigation was com-
menced, the conduct of the officials in question, procedural pre-
cedents under federal and state laws, and the efficacy of the ad-
ministrative solution available. Also of central importance, how-
ever, were the contrasting interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment set forth by the two courts. The New York court's
analysis was that since the unions were not state agents, their
conduct was not attributable to the public officers:
The crux of the complaint as against the defendant public
officials is that they have, in effect, condoned unlawful dis-
crimination in employment on public construction projects
by dealing with contractors who obtained their labor force
from unions which wrongfully exclude qualified Negroes
from their membership and apprenticeship programs. Mani-
festly, however, the discriminatory practices of the unions
are in no way chargeable to the State or City, since such
unions are neither "organs of the State itself" nor "reposi-
tories of official power." ... Nor are there any facts alleged
in the complaint from which it could be inferred that any
State or City officials have been directly involved or have
knowingly acquiesced in any discrimination in employment
on the part of any of the unions or contractors engaged on
the construction projects.7
The United States District Court in Ethridge placed primary
stress on the affirmative duty to prevent exclusion of Negroes
from employment opportunities:
In a venture, such as this one, where the State as a gov-
ernmental entity becomes a joint participant with private
persons, the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
not only to the actions of the State but also the acts of its
private partners - the contractors - and the State is bound
to affirmatively insure compliance with the constitutional
provisions.28
Official discretion, when used to effectuate a waiver of provisions
26 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y. 2d at 129, 204 N.E. 2d at 630 (1965).
27 Gaynor v. Rockefeller, 15 N.Y. 2d at 130, 204 N.E. 2d at 632 (1965).
28 Ethridge v. Rhodes, supra note 5, at 88.
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designed to secure equal protection of the laws for Negroes, was
found to be an inadequate defense to a suit under the fourteenth
amendment.
The obligations arising from governmental partnership with
a private agency which practices discrimination, were developed
in such cases as Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority;2
Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical;3 0 Jones v. Marva Theatres,
Inc.; 3 1 and Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co.2 In Muir, the
United States Supreme Court, reversing a lower court decision,
33
held that a municipality could not rent an auditorium on a short-
term basis to various discriminatory groups. Similarly in Jones,
the municipality was held responsible for the racial policies of
a motion picture theatre which was part of City Hall but leased
to a private operator. The Boman decision found state responsi-
bility where a public franchise had been given to a bus company
allowing it to operate on certain streets and to formulate rules
for seating which based upon the race of passengers.
Judge Kinneary in Ethridge relied on the contractual rela-
tionship between the state and the builder, using the Burton an-
alogy, in defining the scope of "state action." He did not dis-
cuss the legality of disbursing state funds to finance projects
constructed by racially exclusionary unions. However, there is
a growing body of judicial authority in support of the view
that public funds to be used for governmental purposes, may
not be channelled to private discriminatory organizations.
In Pettaway v. County School Board of Surry County, Vir-
ginia,4 the court faced the question of whether public funds
could be expended - even indirectly - for private all-white
schools. It was held that state and county revenues could not
be given in the form of tuition grants to white school children,
because such funds would ultimately subsidize private schools
which excluded Negro pupils. Although tuition grants by states
are generally a legal form of subsidy, they are violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment when they
facilitate racial discrimination.
29 Supra note 1.
30 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
31 180 F. Supp. 49 (D. Md. 1960).
32 280 F. 2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
33 202 F. 2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
34 230 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1964), cause remanded, Griffin v. Prince
Edward County, 339 F. 2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964).
Winter, 1968]
HOWARD LAW JOURNAL
As was said in Griffin v. Prince Edward County,35 affirming
Pettaway and other cases consolidated for review on the same
issue:
The involvement of public officials and public funds so es-
sentially characterizes the enterprise in each of the counties
that the Foundation schools must be regarded as public
facilities in which discrimination on racial lines is consti-
tutionally impermissible.3"
Unconstitutional state action was found in Simkins v. Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital,3 7 where a private hospital which
had received public funds through the Hill-Burton Act3 s denied
Negro physicians and dentists the use of staff facilities on
grounds of race:
Here the most significant contacts compel the conclusion
that the necessary "degree of state [in the broad sense, in-
cluding federal] participation and involvement" is present
as a result of the participation by the defendants in the
Hill-Burton program. The massive use of public funds and
extensive state-federal sharing in the common plan are all
relevant factors. We deal here with the appropriation of
millions of dollars of public moneys pursuant to comprehen-
sive governmental plans. But we emphasize that this is not
merely a controversy over a sum of money. Viewed from
the plaintiffs' standpoint it is an effort by a group of citi-
zens to escape the consequences of discrimination in a
concern touching health and life itself.39
Plaintiffs in Ethridge made the analogy to public funds
which are given under governmental building programs to private
contractors whose hiring agents are racially biased. If discri-
mination is permitted under such programs, Negro craftsmen are
deprived of their livelihood, their opportunity to learn and utilize
their skills.
The language of Simkins and Griffin confines this interpre-
tation of the fourteenth amendment to cases involving govern-
mental projects or functions. Public construction and public
works are physically necessary to the operation of state and
35 339 F. 2d 486, 492 (4th Cir. 1964).
36 Id. at 492.
37 323 F. 2d 959, 967 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
38 60 Stat. 1041 (1946) as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1964).
39 Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., Supra Note 37.
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municipal governments, and partake of more than a private char-
acter.
The recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Guest4 ° indicates the change of direction in fed-
eral law in regard to the degree of state involvement requisite
to a finding that the fourteenth amendment must apply:
This is not to say, however, that the involvement of the
State need be exclusive or direct. In a variety of situations,
the Court has found state action of a nature sufficient to
create rights under the Equal Protection Clause even though
the participation of the State was peripheral, or its action
was only one of several co-operative forces leading to the
constitutional violation.
41
In Guest, six defendants were indicted by a United States
grand jury for criminal conspiracy in violation of Section 241
of Title 18, 41a, making it a crime to deprive citizens of any
right secured by the Constitution and federal law. The allega-
tions of fact involved a pattern of intimidation by Ku Klux Klan
members in Athens, Georgia, who prevented Negroes from using
public facilities, highways and places of public accommodation.
False reports were made to the police pursuant to which Negroes
who used public facilities were groundlessly arrested.
Defendants argued - successfully in the U.S. District Court
but unsuccessfully on appeal - that since neither the government
nor its agents had committed the acts in question, there was no
violation of the constitutional prohibition against discriminatory
state action and no basis for federal interference. The Supreme
Court brought into play the interdictions of the fourteenth
amendment by citing the possibility that there may have been
state connivance in making the false reports which led to the
imprisonment of Negroes. However, the decision was implicitly
grounded upon the view that where Negroes are systematically
blocked from highways and other public places, proof of signifi-
cant state involvement is unnecessary.
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion4" unmistakeably de-
velops the thesis that the fourteenth amendment commands the
40 383 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966), reversing, 246 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Ga., 1964);
13 How. L.J. 189 (1967).
41 United States v. Guest, supra note 40.
41a 18 U.S.C. §241 (1964).
42 Id. at p. 780.
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state to provide all its citizens with equal access to public facili-
ties. Thus there would be a correlative responsibility on the
part of public officials to prevent interference with the use of
such facilities.
The Governor of Ohio, reading Ethridge as creating an
affirmative duty to eliminate barriers to equal employment op-
portunities on public construction, has issued an Executive Or-
der providing that the state "consider only bids from bidders
who affirmatively demonstrate preparation for and readiness to
comply" with state law provisions regarding non-discrimination.4 3
Contractors and sub-contractors are required to use as hiring
sources only unions "in which access to referral facilities, wheth-
er as apprentices or journeymen, is open on equal terms to all
qualified persons. .. "I' Suspension of contracts is made manda-
tory where a violation of this requirement occurs.
However, the Order rescinds the previous Executive Order
of June 15, 1966, which had specified forfeiture of the right to
recruit every twentieth employee hired for public construction
unless the recruiting union had Negroes on its apprenticeship
program.4" Furthermore, there are no standards in the new
Executive Order as to the kind of information which the con-
tractor must supply to show that his labor force has been selected
by the recruiting union without bias. If he has an exclusive hir-
ing hall contract, he may not hire employees directly until he
has given the union thirty days to make referrals which in the
judgment of the employer eliminates the need for hiring outside
the contract.
Executive Orders which require consideration of the con-
tractor's intention and ability to carry out the non-discrimina-
tion provision in the agreement, are in harmony with prior law
regarding the responsibilities of public agencies accepting con-
struction bids. The public agency which awards a contract to
the "lowest responsible bidder" has the duty to investigate the
integrity and moral worth of the bidders, not merely their finan-
cial and technical qualifications.4 5
43 Executive Order of June 5, 1967.
43A Ibid.
44 Supra note 8.
45 See e.g., Matter of Caristo Construction Corp. v. Rubin, 30 Misc. 2d
185, 188, 221 N.Y.S. 2d 956, 969 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Picone v. City of New York,
176 Misc. 967, 969, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 539, 541 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
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The manner in which the contracting agency and the builder
investigate the hiring agent's admission policies and resultant
racial composition will determine the practical effects of the
fourteenth amendment obligations which have been described in
general terms4 6 by federal court decisions. Certainly, the pro
torma insertion of a non-discrimination clause no longer appears
to be sufficient.
If Guest is to be applied by future rulings to hiring for pub-
lic construction, equating such construction projects with "pub-
lic facilities," further authority would be provided for the conclu-
sion in Ethridge that racially based rejection of applicants may
be chargeable to the public agency overseeing the contract. Just-
ice Brennan's interpretation adapted to this situation would re-
quire the contracting governmental agency to insure equal access
to employment on public building sites by actual elimination
of discriminatory hiring. This requirement could be fulfilled
-either by changing the recruitment patterns of those craft unions
which have not adopted objective testing for admission, as in
Matter of State Comm. v. Farrell,47 or by creating new methods
of selecting employees 41 in which public officials and the contrac-
tors themselves would play a decisive part.
46 The Supreme Court in Burton (265 U.S. at p. 725) suggested that "[T]he
Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities
tinder the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a
consequence of state participation." In Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Com-
mittee, 223 F. Supp. 12, 21-22 (N.D. I1. 1963), vacated for mootness, 332 F. 2d
243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965), the District Court in-
dicated that although the General Services Administration of the United States
(which let a contract for construction of a United States Court House) had
attempted to eliminate racial discrimination, attempts were not enough. It
was held that the federal agency should not have permitted "the union and
the Joint Committee to function on a Government Building project." In
Ethridge, the court enjoined defendants from entering into any contracts with
bidders whose labor sources would not "reasonably insure equal job oppor-
tunities to all qualified persons, including journeymen and apprentice craftsmen
and laborers, without regard to race, color, or membership or non-membership
in a labor union."
47 Supra note 15.
48 See the June 15, 1966, Executive Order of the Governor of Ohio.
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